Michigan Law Review
Volume 82
Issue 5 Issue 5&6
1984

Legal Models for the International Regulation of Exchange Rates
Joseph Gold
International Monetary Fund

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph Gold, Legal Models for the International Regulation of Exchange Rates, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1533
(1984).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol82/iss5/27

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

LEGAL MODELS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF EXCHANGE RATES
Joseph Gold*
INTRODUCTION

No legal scholar has contributed more to the study of the harmonization
of national interests by international agreement than Professor Eric Stein.
This essay in his honor examines some of the efforts that have been made
since the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 to bring order into the
important international relationships that are called exchange rates. The
subject has a further pertinence because of Eric Stein's work on the European Community. The law of the Community on exchange rates has been
affected by the fortunes of the law of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). The Treaty of Rome relied to a large extent on the legal order established originally by the IMF's Articles of Agreement, but the Community has attempted to create its own system as the wider order of the IMF
has come under the pressure of troublesome economic developments. Here
is another aspect of harmonization: the law of the European collectivity
must fit into the law of the broader society of nations. Finally, the subject is
timely because the behavior of exchange rates is a constant preoccupation
of monetary authorities and scholars and provokes them to call for improvements in international monetary arrangements.
National and International Interests

The exchange rate for a country's currency is one of the most important
prices in the national economy, and often the most important price, but the
exchange rate is also a price in the international economy. The exchange
rate between the currencies of two countries is a relationship between the
currencies and between the economies of the two countries. "In an open
trade and payments system exchange rates are bound to lie at the center of
economic relations between sovereign states." 1 This fact suggests that exchange rates should be subject to international agreement in some form if
disorder is to be avoided in economic relations among states.
Nevertheless, the traditional view could be expressed by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in 1929 in the simple assertion that "[i]t is
indeed a generally accepted principle that a State is entitled to regulate its
own currency."2 The Bretton Woods Conference, in producing the Articles
of Agreement of the IMF, revolutionized international monetary law and
international economic relations. Lord Keynes, one of the leaders in this
• Senior Consultant of the International Monetary Fund. LL.B., LL.M 1935-36, University of London; S.J.D. 1942, Harvard University. - Ed.
1. GROUP OF THIRTY, THE PROBLEMS OF EXCHANGE RATES 10 (1982).
2. Case of Serbian Loans, 1929 P.C.I.J., ser. A, Nos. 20/21, at 44.
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revolution, wrote about the necessity for change in a letter dated May 29,
1945 to Edward M. Bernstein of the U.S. Treasury:
Pigou has just called my attention to a passage in Marshall's Evidence
before the Gold and Silver Commission-Q. 10,006, more than fifty years
ago (have we yet asked more than 10,000 questions about Bretton Woods?)
as follows:! think that there is a real, though very slow-moving, tendency for national interests to
overrule provincial interests, and international interests to overrule national, and I think
the time will come at which it will be thought as unreasonable for any country to regulate
its currency without reference to other countries as it would be to have signalling codes at
sea which took no account of the signalling codes at sea of other countries.

So once more we may hope the old man has been right, with not much
more of a time-lag than it is reasonable to expect, at least in international
affairs. 3
The participants in the Bretton Woods Conference accepted the principle that because exchange rates were matters of international concern, they
should be subject to international consultation and agreement. A major
argument to support this radical change was that the pooling of authority
by all countries would protect the agreed exchange rate of each country's
currency from unfair competition by other countries when establishing the
exchange rates for their currencies.4
International monetary conditions have become turbulent in recent
years. Great changes have occurred in the law governing exchange rates,
and, as noted earlier, proposals have been made for further developments.
It is useful, therefore, to attempt to isolate some essential characteristics of
various models that have been employed, or have been recommended, for
the regulation of exchange rates by procedures not solely dependent on the
exercise of discretion by the issuer of the currency.
Procedures that are not confined to the exercise of discretion of the issuer imply a role for an entity external to the issuer. Some of the main
elements to be discussed in the models that involve such an entity are:
(i) the fixed or floating character of the exchange rate for a currency;
(ii) the initiative that can be taken to establish the exchange rate;
(iii) the external entity authorized to react to the exchange rate;
(iv) the stage at which the external entity reacts;
(v) the majority for the decision of the external entity by which it reacts.
Former Par Value System of IMF
The original Articles of the IMF, which became effective on December
27, 1945, established a par value system5 that distributed legal authority in
3. THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, VOLUME XXVI, ACTIVITIES
1941-1946: SHAPING THE POST-WAR WORLD, BRETTON WOODS, AND REPARATIONS 195 (0.
Moggridge ed. 1980).
4. 3 J. HoRSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965, at 65-66 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as 3 J. HORSEFIELD].
5. For a detailed discussion and references, see Gold, Developments in the International
Monetary System, the International Monetary Fund, and International Monetary Law Since
1971, 174 ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECUEIL DES CouRS 107 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as i}evelopments in the International Monetary System]; Gold, Legal Structure of Par
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relation to the exchange rate of a member's currency between the IMF and
the member. Each member had to reach agreement with the IMF on an
initial par value for the member's currency in terms of gold as the common
denominator of the system.6 The IMF would deem an initial par value
suitable if it could be sustained without the need for undue financial support by the IMF.
The objective of the par value system was the stability of exchange rates,
while avoiding rigidity. To provide elasticity, the Articles permitted
changes in par values. A member could propose a change in the par value
of its currency, but, to promote stability, the member's privilege was formulated negatively, and the test to be met by a proposal was severe: "A member shall not propose a change in the par value of its currency except to
correct a fundamental disequilibrium." 7 A proposal was not justified if it
was intended to deal with a transitory problem. The IMF's pool of resources could be drawn on to enable a member to ride out such a problem
without a change of par value.
A proposed change, which had to be to another fixed value, had to be
sufficient to correct the fundamental disequilibrium. A proposed devaluation was objectionable ifit was excessive, because it would be unfairly competitive with other members. A proposed revaluation was objectionable if
it was inadequate, because it would excite the prospect of further changes
and encourage speculation, which would lead to unstable exchange rates.
A member had to consult the IMF before making any change of par
value. The concurrence of the IMF was necessary, except in some situations of minor importance. If the IMF was satisfied that a proposal met the
test for changes, the IMF had to concur in the proposal. The IMF could
not object if, for example, it would have preferred the member to follow
deflationary policies and avoid a change of par value.
Each member had to adopt measures consistent with the Articles that
would make the par value for the member's currency effective in exchange
transactions within its territories. The measures had to ensure that transactions for the exchange of the member's currency and another member's currency were conducted at exchange rates that did not go beyond narrow
limits as defined by the Articles. These limits were above and below the
relationship (the parity) between the two currencies that was derived from
their par values. The measure chosen by the U.S. to perform its obligation
to maintain the par value of the dollar was the readiness of the U.S. to buy
and sell gold for dollars with the monetary authorities of other members at
prices based on the par value. The measure chosen by other members was
their readiness, whenever necessary, to intervene in the exchange markets
by buying and selling dollars (or another currency convertible into dollars)
for their own currency. The rates of exchange in these transactions had to
Value System Before Second Amendment, in LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED EsSAYS 520 (1979).
6. The par value could be fixed in relation to the U.S. dollar of the gold value as of July I,
1944, but the effect was simply to fix the par value indirectly in terms of gold.
7. Article IV, Section 5(a), Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
openedfor signature July 22, 1944, 20 U.S.T. 2755, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
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be kept within the defined limits around the parity between their currency
and the dollar and the other intervention currency of their choice.
The IMF was not empowered to authorize a member to adopt a floating
exchange rate for its currency instead of maintaining an effective par
value. 8 A rate floated when the exchange rates in transactions were not
kept within the defined limits around parities. The fundamental assumption of the par value system was that fixed rates produced better economic
results than floating rates. In addition, governments had concluded that
fixed rates could be maintained without unacceptable difficulties and that
international control could be exercised more effectively over fixed rates.
Another principle of the Articles was that a member should have a unitary exchange rate for its currency. A member should not have different
rates for different transactions (multiple currency practices) or exchange
rates for its currency that were not consistent with all the parities between
its currency and other currencies and therefore were necessarily less
favorable for some as compared with other currencies (discriminatory currency arrangements). These two categories of exchange measures were prohibited because they harmed the member that imposed them or other
members. The IMF was authorized, nevertheless, to permit a member to
depart from a unitary exchange rate for its currency. If the IMF approved a
member's request to impose a multiple currency practice, the reason normally was that the member could not readily institute other, and possibly
nonmonetary, measures with equivalent effect when dealing with an exchange emergency. The IMF would approve the practice for a limited period only. The IMF became increasingly reluctant to approve
discriminatory currency arrangements.
The objective of the original Articles can be summarized as the maintenance of fixed, unitary, and nondiscriminatory exchange rates that carried
the endorsement of the international community as expressed in decisions
of the IMF. Multiple currency practices and discriminatory currency arrangements were interferences with the pattern of exchange rates that
would result from the full realization of the objective of the par value system. The prohibition of these measures, and the IMF's authority to approve derogations, are preserved by the present Articles notwithstanding
the disappearance of the par value systems. The economic reasons for continuing to prefer rates that are unitary and nondiscriminatory, even though
they are not fixed or endorsed as they were in the days of the par value
system, are similar to those of the past.
When the original Articles were being negotiated, the United States favored a transfer to the IMF of greater authority over exchange rates than
8. Under the original Articles, the IMF had authority, in the event of an emergency or the
development of unforeseen circumstances threatening the operations of the IMF, to suspend
the provisions on the limits around parities that had to be observed in exchange transactions.
The authority was conferred on the IMF because of the unprecedented character of the par
value obligations. A unanimous vote of the Executive Directors was required for a suspension
up to 120 days and an 80 per cent majority of total voting power in the Board of Governors for
an additional period not exceeding 240 days. Par values were not abrogated by a suspension,
but suspension validated floating for the time being. For this reason, a decision to suspend was
not considered after August 15, 1971, because it was assumed that some members would not
agree to validate the action taken by the United States on that date.
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the United Kingdom was willing to concede. The United Kingdom succeeded in negotiating acceptance of the principle that a member would retain ultimate authority over the exchange rate for its currency if an
irreconcilable difference with the IMF about a change were to arise. If the
IMF objected to a change of par value as proposed by a member, but the
member nevertheless put the change into effect, the unauthorized change
would not be deemed to be a violation of the Articles. The member was
shielded against the odium of violation, even though the member was automatically denied the use of the IMF's resources in support of the new par
value and even though ineligibility to use the resources was also the penalty
for a violation. If t~e difference of opinion persisted beyond a reasonable
period, the IMF could compel the member to withdraw from the organization. The power to compel withdrawal demonstrated how central was the
international acceptability of exchange rates in the compact among members represented by the Articles.
The decisions of the IMF in the exercise of its authority over exchange
rates were taken with a majority of the votes cast in the Executive Board.
Each Executive Director could cast, as a unit, the number of votes allocated
to the member that appointed him, or to the group of members that elected
him, according to the formula for weighted voting power in the Articles.
The existence of a simple majority of the votes cast was determined on any
occasion without reference to the votes of Executive Directors who abstained in the voting. It was conceivable, therefore, that a decision might be
taken by a proportion of voting power that was less than a majority of the
total voting power of all members. These provisions on voting have not
been amended when a simple majority suffices.
It is remarkable that countries, in moving from the uncontrolled national determination of exchange rates to international regulation, accepted
the exercise of international authority by decisions taken with so small a
proportion of total voting power.9 This development was not less remarkable because a member was entitled to have its votes cast even when a decision related to its own currency. No member could carry or veto these
decisions by the exercise of its own voting power.
The negotiators of the original Articles required high majorities of total
voting power for only a few categories of decisions on exchange rates or
other matters. The United States may have refrained from negotiating a
broad veto for itself because of the enormous strength of its economy and
currency and the influence it expected to have as a result. Led by the
United States, the negotiators held the view that the business of the IMF
should be conducted expeditiously. A simple majority of the votes cast was
more likely to promote the dispatch of business. This majority would prevent obstruction by a dissident minority, because Executive Directors who
sat on the fence by abstaining would not be able to obstruct those who
stood erect and were counted. Once a proposal involving an exchange rate
9. Gold, The Origins of Weighted Voting Power in the Fund, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT,
Mar. 1981, at 25. The Plan for a Stabilization Fund prepared by H.D. White of the U.S.
Treasury proposed, in versions of April 1942 and July 19, 1943, that, in the interest of stability,
changes in exchange rates should be permitted only by decisions of the Fund adopted with a
high majority of the total voting power. See 3 J. HoRSEFIELD, supra note 3, at 60, 89.
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was on the agenda of the Executive Board, delay in taking a decision because a special majority had to be marshalled could be particularly harmful. Knowledge of the proposal while still unresolved might become public
and provoke destabilizing speculation.
In the par value system of the original Articles, the five variable elements in the models discussed in this article were treated as follows:
(i) A member had to establish a par value for its currency in terms of
gold as the common denominator of the system, which meant that the
member established exchange rates for its currency that were fixed within
narrow margins above and below parities.
(ii) A member had the power of initiative to propose the par value for its
currency.
(iii) The IMF was required to concur in or object to the member's proposed choice of par value.
(iv) A member had to seek the reaction of the IMF before establishing a
par value.
(v) The IMF reacted by means of decisions taken with a majority of the
votes cast in the Executive Board.
Possible Future Par Value System of IMF
After the collapse of the original par value system, the Articles of the
IMF were rewritten by the Second Amendment, which became effective on
April 1, 1978, and is still in force. The present Articles contain provisions
on a revised par value system 10 that can be brought into operation by a
decision of the Executive Board taken with a majority of eighty-five percent
of the total voting power. The conditions in which the decision could be
taken are specified in the Articles. 11 The provisions that would regulate the
revised system, if it were called into being, draw on the original Articles but
have been modified to avoid the rigidity that became a feature of the former
par value system and to take account of other lessons of experience. As a
result of this approach, there are important legal differences between the
two systems. 12
Three of the chief differences involve the common denominator, floating exchange rates, and the majorities for decisions. The common denominator of the revised system would be selected by the IMF, but the choice of
gold or a currency is prohibited, because experience has shown that they
would not function efficiently. It is assumed, but not required, that the
common denominator would be the SDR, the monetary reserve asset created by the First Amendment, which took effect on July 28, 1969. The
negotiators did not prescribe the SDR because of some apprehension that
the IMF's method of valuing it might not be wholly satisfactory for the par
value system. If, however, the majority existed for calling the par value
IO. Schedule C, Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, entered into farce Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
1I. Article IV, Section 4, Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, entered into force Apr. I, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
12. For a detailed examination of the differences, see JJevelopments in the International
Monetary System, supra note 5, at 245-62.
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system into existence, it is unlikely that a majority could not be found for
ensuring that a satisfactory method of valuing the SDR was in place.
A member would not be bound to establish a par value for its currency
and would not have to give a reason for its decision to refrain. Nor would
the member have special obligations because of this decision. Members
would have greater freedom, therefore, than was foreseen by the Outline ef
Reform presented to the Board of Governors on June 4, 1974 by its Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues
(Committee of 20 or C-20). The Outline assumed that at some time a system of "stable but adjustable par values" would be instituted without precluding floating rates "in particular situations, subject to Fund
authorization, surveillance, and review." The language was deliberately
vague, so that the IMF would have been able to define "particular situations." Furthermore, authorization would have been given only "on condition that the country undertakes to conform with agreed guidelines for
conduct." 13
If a member proposed a par value under the revised system of the Articles, but the IMF decided to object by a majority of the votes cast, the par
value would not take effect for the purposes of the Articles. If the IMF did
not object and the par value became effective in this way, the member
would have to ensure that the rates in exchange transactions within its territories did not go beyond defined limits around parities. To permit greater
flexibility, these limits could be, and probably would be, broader than those
of the original Articles.
Under the original par value system, a member could propose a change
in the par value of its currency only to correct a fundamental disequilibrium. The purpose of this language also was to promote stability, but it
seemed to suggest that a member could not move to change a par value
before falling into the abyss of deep disequilibrium. The revised system
would permit a member to propose a change either to correct a fundamental disequilibrium that had developed or to prevent one from developing.
In either circumstance, the change could be made only on the proposal
of the member, after consultation with the IMF, and with its concurrence.
If the IMF objected, the change would not become effective for the purposes of the Articles. If the member instituted the change notwithstanding
the objection of the IMF, not only would the par value be ineffective for the
IMF but in addition the member would be in violation of the Articles. The
concept of the unauthorized change as undesirable but not a violation has
disappeared. The Articles instruct the IMF to discourage the maintenance
of an unrealistic par value. This instruction would have to be reconciled
somehow with the absence of authority for the IMF to propose the change
that should be made. The Managing Director would not be prevented from
suggesting privately the par value that he would support as realistic if the
member were to propose it.
The original Articles did not permit a member to jettison the anchor of
a par value. The revised system would allow a member to give notice that it
13. COMMITTEE ON REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND RELATED
ISSUES, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM: DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF TWENTY
11-12 (1974).
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intended to terminate a par value without establishing a new one, but the
IMF could object to this action by a decision taken with eighty-five percent
of the total voting power. The IMF would not be required to decide that it
concurred if it did not object. If the member terminated the par value
notwithstanding the objection of the IMF, the member would be in violation of the Articles. The par value, however, would cease to exist for the
purposes of the Articles.
Under the original Articles, if a currency was floating, the IMF could
not recognize the disappearance of the par value as a legal fact. The purpose of the legal fiction that the par value still existed was to put pressure on
members not to abandon par values, but the IMF's assertion that a par
value persisted in law after it had disappeared in fact seemed bizarre when
inquiries were made about the legal status of the currency. To avoid this
situation, the Second Amendment is emphatic in declaring that in certain
circumstances a par value would cease to exist for the purposes of the Articles. Under the revised par value system, a member might forbear from
giving notice that it was terminating a par value even though few or no
exchange transactions involving the currency were conducted at exchange
rates based on parities with other currencies. In the interest once again of
realism, the IMF would have the authority in these circumstances to find
that the par value had ceased to exist for the purposes of the Articles. If the
par value of a member's currency was terminated by the member or ceased
to exist under a decision of the IMF, the member would not be prevented
from establishing a par value at a later date.
For most of the decisions on exchange rates, a majority of the votes cast
would suffice. This majority has been retained for the reasons that justified
it under the original Articles. The majority of eighty-five percent of total
voting power would be required, however, for decisions to call the revised
par value system into operation or to object to an intended termination of a
par value. The explanation of the requirement of this high majority, and of
some other features of the revised system, is the position taken by the
United States in the negotiation of the Second Amendment. The United
States had concluded that the former par value system had given the United
States less freedom to manage the exchange rate for its currency than had
been available to other members. They had established exchange rates for
their currencies in relation to the U.S. dollar as the currency of the most
powerful economy. In effect, therefore, other members had determined exchange rates for the dollar. The United States believed that if it had taken
an initiative to change the par value of the dollar, other members would
have made corresponding changes that would have cancelled the benefit
that the United States was seeking.
In the drafting of the Second Amendment, the United States wanted to
be assured that it would not be locked once again into its former predicament if the revised par value system began to operate. Under the present
Articles, therefore, the United States would be entitled to refrain from establishing an initial par value, although it is difficult to imagine that the
United States would make this choice after voting in favor of calling the
revised par value system into being. Moreover, the United States would be
able to terminate a par value for the dollar, in effect at will, because the
voting power of the United States would enable it, without the support of
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any other member, to veto a proposed decision of the IMF to object to the
termination.
The requirement of the majority of eighty-five percent for some decisions on exchange rates can be understood to reflect a wider distribution of
economic and financial power in the world than existed at the time of the
Bretton Woods Conference. The implication of the special majority is that
the United States cannot assume that its view will predominate because of
its role in the world.
The main elements in the revised par value system have been arranged
as follows:
(i) Par values for currencies would be fixed in terms of a common denominator, which would produce exchange rates fixed within prescribed
margins around the parities with other currencies that had par values, but
the floating of a currency could be valid.
(ii) A member could decide not to establish an initial par value; the member could take the initiative at any time to propose a par value or the termination of an existing par value (i.e., without proposing a change to a new
par value).
(iii) The IMF would be required to concur in or object to a proposed par
value, and it could object to the termination of a par value.
(iv) A member would have to seek the reaction of the IMF before establishing a par value and would have to give notice before terminating a par
value, but the IMF could find that a par value had ceased to exist even in
the absence of notice.
(v) The IMF would react to a proposal to establish a par value by a decision taken with a majority of the votes cast, but eighty-five percent of the
total voting power would be necessary for a decision by the IMF to object
to an intention to terminate a par value.
Present IMF Law
The law of the IMF that governs exchange rates at the present time is
fundamentally different from the original law or the provisions governing
the possible future par value system, even though the principle that exchange rates are matters of international concern has not been forsaken.
The balance of authority over exchange rates between the IMF and members that prevailed in the past has been altered and now tilts strongly toward members. 14
Formerly, only one exchange arrangement was in full accord with the
law and spirit of the Articles: a par value accepted by the IMF. A member
is free now to choose its exchange arrangement, with only one exception. A
member may not maintain the value of its currency in terms of gold, because a gradual reduction in the role of gold in the international monetary
system is one of the objectives of the Second Amendment. Furthermore, a
member, having chosen its exchange arrangement, may determine the value
of its currency in relation to other currencies by action or may permit the
value to develop by inaction. A member is not required, as a condition of
14. For the present provisions on exchange arrangements, see Article IV, Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of International Monetary Fund, entered into farce Apr. 1,
1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8973.
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selecting its exchange arrangement or of determining the external value of
its currency, to seek the concurrence of the IMF.
This freedom for members has produced a casserole of exchange arrangements composed of ingredients so numerous and so varied that classification of them by the IMF requires eleven columns, garnished with eleven
footnotes for deviations and nuances. To give some impression of this complexity, it is sufficient to tabulate the headings and subheadings of this
classification:
Pegged

U.S. dollar; French franc; other currency; SDR; other composite
Flexibility Limited vis-a-vis a Single Currency or Group of Currencies
Single currency; cooperative arrangements
More flexible

Adjusted according to a set of indicators; other managed floating; independently floating
The United States, as the main advocate of the freedom described
above, argued that the stability of exchange rates had become a fetish that
had contributed to the breakdown of the par value system. Members
should be free to choose their domestic policies without the constraint imposed by an obligation to maintain an external value for their currencies. If
members pursued policies to bring about orderly underlying conditions, the
result would be a stable system of exchange rates, although not necessarily
stable rates, because rates should be permitted to respond suitably to changing conditions.
Members had to be subject to some obligations, notwithstanding the
broad freedom assured to them, or else freedom would become license. To
achieve the new goal of a stable system, the Articles impose some obligations on the way members behave in applying their chosen exchange arrangement, although the obligations lac)c precision.
Each member is subject to a general obligation to collaborate with the
IMF and other members "to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to
promote a stable system of exchange arrangements." 15 Four obligations of
a more specific character provide some content for this general obligation.
Two of the more specific obligations are more hortatory than peremptory.
They have been drafted in this way because they are not confined to members' external policies. The other two obligations relate to external policies
only, for which reason it was more difficult to resist sharper language. No
one of the general or more specific obligations is formulated in language
that ~akes nonobservance apparent without a decision of the IMF. Nothing in a member's behavior now would be comparable to the obvious failure of a member to maintain an effective par value in the days of the par
value system.
The five obligations are not limited to current conditions. The obligations will have to be observed at all times and would apply if the IMF were
to make the recommendations referred to below or were to call the revised
par value system into being.
15. Article IV, Section 1, Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of International Monetary Fund, entered into farce Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8973.
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The IMF is required to monitor the international monetary system, in
order to ensure its effective operation, and also the compliance of each
member with its obligations of behavior. To fulfill these functions, the IMF
must exercise "firm surveillance" over the exchange rate policies of members. For this purpose, the IMF is directed to adopt "specific principles for
the guidance of all members with respect to those policies," but the principles must not interfere with the freedom of members to choose their exchange arrangements. The IMF consults with members on their exchange
rate policies. A member's failure to observe a specific principle of guidance
would not be considered in itself a breach of obligation. The IMF would
have to take account of this failure, but of all other relevant circumstances
as well, in deciding whether a member was failing to perform an obligation.
Decisions of the IMF in the exercise of its powers of surveillance are taken
with a majority of the votes cast.
The IMF's duty to oversee the international monetary system must be
distinguished from the function of helping the system to develop. In accordance with this function, the IMF "may make provision for general exchange arrangements." This language means no more than that the IMF
may recommend a particular kind of exchange arrangement to the membership at large. An implication of the provision is that the recommended
exchange arrangement is already in widespread use. The IMF cannot impose an obligation on members to apply the exchange arrangement, because the Articles declare that members retain their freedom of choice even
after the IMF makes a recommendation. Nevertheless, a recommendation
would have moral weight, and because it would exert this pressure, a majority of eighty-five percent of the total voting power has been made necessary for a decision to present recommendations to members.
Under the law now in force under the Articles, the five variables can be
summarized as follows:
(i) A member is not required to have a fixed exchange rate for its currency, but a member may peg its currency to any denominator of its choice
except gold.
(ii) A member is authorized not only to choose its exchange arrangement
but also to establish and manage the exchange rate for its currency or to
refrain from doing so by allowing the rate to float.
(iii) The IMF is not authorized to concur in or object to a member's choice
of exchange arrangement.
(iv) The IMF can decide that a member's behavior in applying its exchange arrangement is not in accordance with its obligations as stated in
the Articles or with the IMF's specific principles of guidance as declared
from time to time. ,
(v) The decisions in (iv) above are taken with a majority of the votes cast.
Central Rates and Target Zones

For a few years after the breakdown of the par value system, there was a
common assumption that agreement would be reached on the restoration of
such a system, although with improvements. In that period, the IMF
adopted what was described as a temporary regime of central rates and
wider margins. The rules of the regime were a stopgap device that could
not validate exchange rates under the unamended Articles, but were

1544

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:1533

designed to minimize disorder at a time when the par value system was
ineffective. Members were told that if they acted in accordance with the
rules of the temporary regime, they would be deemed to be collaborating
with the IMF in current conditions, although conformity with these rules
would not be considered the exclusive mode of collaboration. 16
The essence of the first decision on central rates was that a member
would be deemed to be collaborating with the IMF if the member maintained a stable rate for its currency as the basis for exchange transactions in
its territory. A rate was "stable" if it was based on a central rate expressed
directly or indirectly in terms of gold. An initial or subsequent central rate
communicated to the IMF took effect under the decision unless the IMF
found the rate unsatisfactory. A central rate had the virtue that, because it
was not recognized as a par value, the procedures under the Articles and
under a member's domestic law for the establishment of a par value did not
have to be followed for the establishment of a central rate, and the IMF did
not have to concur in the rate, although the IMF reserved the right to find
that a communicated rate was unsatisfactory.
The second decision on central rates did not require the direct or indirect expression of a central rate in terms of gold. It was sufficient if the
currency was stable in terms of another currency, even if that other currency was not itself maintained as a stable currency in the sense of the first
decision and floated independently.
For members with currencies that were floating independently, which
were defined as currencies that were not pegged within relatively narrow
margins to another currency or composite of currencies, the IMF adopted a
decision on June 13, 1974, entitled Guidelines for the Management of
Floating Exchange Rates. 17 The IMF recommended that if a currency was
floating independently, the issuer should use its best endeavors to observe
the Guidelines, but the IMF did not purport to treat observance as obligatory. Throughout its history, the IMF has been reluctant to prescribe specific obligations for members to collaborate. Guidelines have seemed to be
preferable because they can be administered flexibly and because they can
be modified by decisions as experience is gained or as conditions change.
Practices that accorded with the Guidelines were not validated by them
if they were not in conformity with the Articles. The Guidelines were no
more capable of conferring validity under the unamended Articles than
were the decisions on central rates and wider margins. Only observance of
the provisions of the Articles on par values and exchange rates could confer
legality on exchange rates before the Second Amendment.
The first two of the six Guidelines of 1974 defined conduct that a member should follow (i) to smooth out fluctuations in the exchange rate for the
member's currency from day to day and from week to week and (ii) to
moderate movements from month to month and from quarter to quarter.
The third Guideline recognized that a member might wish to act otherwise
than in accordance with the first two Guidelines in order to bring the exchange rate within, or closer to, some target zone of rates.
16. SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13-21 (8th issue
1976).
11. Id at 21-30.

April/May 1984]

International Regulation of Exchange Rates

1545

A member disposed to establish a target zone was expected to consult
the IMF about this zone and its adaptation to changing circumstances. If
the IMF considered the zone to be within the range of reasonable estimates
of the medium-term norm for the exchange rate, the member would be free
to move its exchange rate toward the zone, subject to certain reservations,
even if this action was not in accordance with the first two Guidelines. The
concept of the norm was that of an exchange rate that would tend to bring
about equilibrium in the balance of payments as defined. The medium-term
was expressed, with evident hesitancy, to be a period of about four years.
If a member had a medium-term norm for its currency, and if the IMF
concluded that the exchange rate had moved outside the range of reasonable estimates for the norm to an extent that was likely to be harmful to the
interests of members, the IMF could take the initiative to approach the
member. The IMF could make recommendations, but only after the Managing Director had consulted the member. The IMF was to observe restraint in all cases, but particularly if there was great uncertainty regarding
the balance of payments situation and prospects of a member.
The Guidelines were abrogated as a result of the Second Amendment of
the Articles. The IMF is now required to adopt specific principles for the
guidance of "all members." The reference to all members reflects the freedom that members have to choose their exchange arrangements, the policy
of avoiding any legal or moral implication that pegging is preferable to
floating, and dissatisfaction with the concentration of the Guidelines on
members with unpegged currencies.
The performance of exchange rates in present conditions has been the
subject of much criticism. Target zones, in concept at least, offer an obvious
halfway house between the fixity of a par value system and the permissiveness of the current law. It is not surprising, therefore, that some economists
are now recommending target zones, with some role for the IMF, although
there is also much resistance to the suggestion of target zones. 18
If there were to be enough official sympathy for target zones, the IMF
could act in support of them and could have a role in their administration
under a variety of powers in the present Articles. The IMF could rely on
the obligation of members to collaborate, the power to adopt specific principles of guidance, or the power to recommend general exchange
arrangements. 19
The Guidelines of 1974 dealt with the five variables in the following
manner:
(i) A target zone was a compromise between fixed and floating exchange
rates.
18. For the opposing views of two ex-U.S. Treasury officials, compare Roosa, Intervention
Methods Can .Define Target Zones, J. of Com., June 3, 1983, at 4A, col. 2, with Widman,
Exchange Rate Targeting Will Not Work, J. of Com., Dec. 16, 1982, at 4A, col. 2; see also J.
WILLIAMSON, THE EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM (1983). These authors do not discuss the 1974
Guidelines on target zones or the reasons for the failure of the idea as embodied in the
Guidelines.
19. Another technique would be available but would be less appealing. The IMF could
call the par value system into operation and establish wide limits around parities. The Articles
provide already for limits as broad as 4 ½ percent, but the IMF could establish other limits by
decisions taken with 85 percent of the total voting power.
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(ii) A member, and not the IMF, could take the initiative to establish a
target zone.
(iii) A member that decided to establish a target zone was to consult the
IMF on it. The IMF, it seemed, could endorse or oppose the target zone
the member was choosing. It was also implied that if the IMF opposed the
choice, the member would be acting inappropriately, although not necessarily illegally, by departing from those Guidelines that could be neglected
if the IMF had endorsed the member's target zone.
(iv) It was implied that the IMF should have the opportunity to react
before a target zone was established, although reaction after the event was
not precluded.
(v) All decisions of the IMF under the Guidelines would be taken with a
majority of the votes cast.

European Monetary System

The fluctuation of exchange rates, particularly for the U.S. dollar, has
led to an important development in the regulation of exchange rates. The
European Community (EC) concluded that the instability of exchange rates
was prejudicial to its objectives. The European Council, after meeting in
Bremen, issued a communique on July 7, 1978, announcing the intention to
create the European Monetary System (EMS) in the hope of establishing "a
zone of monetary stability" in Europe. A Resolution of the Council on
December 5, 1978, established the structure of the EMS and an Agreement
of March 13, 1979, among the Central Banks of the EC set forth the operating procedures.20 The EMS is more than an attempt to bring order into
exchange arrangements in the EC; the EMS is intended to promote the integration of the EC. The exchange rate arrangements of the EMS can be
considered a regional par value system based upon a common denominator
of its own, the European Currency Unit (ECU), which is also a monetary
asset and has even further functions in the EMS and in other activities of
the EC. The EMS began to operate on March 13, 1979.
The ECU is a basket of defined amounts of the currencies of EC members, except the Greek drachma, which will be included in the basket not
later than the end of 1985. The amounts of currencies in the basket can be
revised in certain circumstances. Revisions, which are to be made in line
with underlying economic criteria, have to be mutually accepted, which
suggests that the agreement is necessary of all the issuers of currencies in
the basket. The original basket has not been changed so far (the end of
1983).
Members of the EC may elect to participate in the exchange arrangements of the EMS. All members have become participants, except the
United Kingdom and Greece, which may participate later. Each participant establishes a central rate for its currency in terms of the ECU. Initial
central rates were established by agreeement. The central rates among parties to the narrow margins arrangement ("the snake"), which preceded the
20. TEXTS CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM (1979) and 12
(July 1982) include the constitutive documents of the EMS.
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EMS,2 1 correspond to the central rates established under that arrangement.
The central rates of the currencies of other participants in the exchange
arrangements of the EMS were based on prevailing exchange rates, with
necessary adjustments, between the currencies of these participants and the
currencies of parties to "the snake."
Adjustments in central rates are subject to "mutual agreement by a common procedure which will comprise all countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism and the Commission."22 It is not clear from this
language whether changes can be made only by unanimous agreement
among the participants and the Commission of the EC, but adjustments
seem to have been made with common consent before the changes were put
into effect. Common consent is feasible among so small a number of participants, even if hard bargaining precedes common consent. No provision
is made for weighted voting power. It would be without legal impact on
decisions for which unanimity was required. The justification for common
consent is the obvious one of the economic consequences of a change in
central rate for partners in so close an undertaking as the EMS. Opposing
views have been expressed by expert commentators on whether a participant violates Community law by changing a central rate notwithstanding
the absence of agreement in the common procedure.23
The need for common consent is understandable for the further reason
that an adjustment of the central rate for a participant's currency modifies
the central rate for the currency of all other participants in an opposite direction. An adjustment produces this consequence because the number of
units of a participant's currency in the ECU is fixed and the value of them,
therefore, is affected by the adjustment. The values in relation to the ECU
of all other currencies that compose the ECU change as a result of the
change in value of a component currency.
An unusual feature of the procedure for common consent is that the
amount of change in a central rate appears to be the subject of negotiation
and counter-proposals.24 This practice differs from the procedure for
changes in par values under the former par value system of the IMF. A
member proposed a change, but the IMF was not authorized to negotiate a
different change. The word "concur" instead of "agree" to describe a possible reaction of the IMF was carefully chosen to emphasize the member's
authority over its currency and to create a presumption in favor of the
IMF's acceptance of a proposal. The IMF, it is true, could object to the
amount of a proposed change as inadequate or excessive, but it was then
the member's privilege to make a new proposal if it wished. The IMF could
21. For differences between the EMS and the snake, see J. GOLD, SDRs, CURRENCIES,
AND GOLD: FOURTH SURVEY OF NEW LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 63-64 (1980).
22. TEXTS CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM, supra note 20, at 44-45.
23. Smits, Some Aspects efthe Monetary Law ofthe European Community, JuRIDICA n.120
(1984) (forthcoming). There is no express concept in the EMS that resembles the unauthorized
change of par value under the original Articles of the IMF.
24. The first multilateral negotiation of changes made in exchange rates appears to have
been the one, engaged in by ten of the main industrialized members of the IMF, that led to the
Smithsonian agreement of December 18, 1971.
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not decide that the member had to make a new proposal or what that proposal had to be.
A bilateral relationship arises between each pair of currencies as a consequence of central rates under EMS arrangements. Participants must observe limits of 2.25 percent above and below the bilateral relationship
between the currencies involved in spot exchange transactions. When a
currency reaches the upper or lower limit against another currency, the central bank of each of the two participants must intervene in the exchange
market in the currency of the other participant. Italy avails itself of the
privilege of limits of six percent, but they are to be gradually reduced as
economic conditions permit.
A "divergence indicator" has been defined that gives a signal if the exchange rate of a currency is moving out of line with the average exchange
rates of all other currencies. If a participant's currency crosses its "threshold of divergence," a presumption arises that the participant will correct the
situation by adequate measures, which may include a change in central
rate, but the choice of measures is left to the participant. If, "on account of
special circumstances," measures are not taken, an explanation must be
given to the other participants.
European countries outside the EC with particularly close economic and
financial ties with the EC may join in the exchange arrangements of the
EMS. Agreements would have to be reached for this purpose among all the
central banks involved. No agreements had been reached by the end of
1983. The EC has declared that the EMS is, and will remain, fully compatible with the relevant provisions of the IMF's Articles.
The five variable elements have been incorporated in the EMS in the
following manner:
(i) A participant must establish a fixed central rate for its currency in
terms of the ECU.
(ii) A participant can take the initiative to change the central rate for its
currency.
(iii) The other participants and the EC Commission must react to a proposed change in central rate.
(iv) A participant must seek this reaction before making a change.
(v) It seems that the unanimous agreement of the other participants and
the Commission is necessary.
The EMS is not the only regional agreement among countries by which
they accept some de jure or de facto limitation on their freedom to determine exchange rates. The arrangements vary greatly in their complexity,
the degree of limitation they apply, and their objectives. Monetary unions
and monetary zones are among the arrangements. 25
Imposed Exchange Rates

In all the models considered above, the issuer of a currency retains legal
authority, although in different degrees, to determine the exchange rate of
its currency. In other models, the exchange rate of a currency may be im25. Collyns,Altematives to the Central Bank in the Developing World, in IMF OCCASIONAL
29 {1983).
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posed by an external entity. It is astonishing to recall that H.D. While, the
main official in the United States behind the plan for a Stabilization Fund
in the early forties, thought that the organization should establish the rate
of exchange for a member's currency at which the organization would conduct transactions with the member. 26 He recognized that the Stabilization
Fund's action might have the effect of determining the exchange rate for
exchange transactions even when the Fund was not a party to them.27 The
idea did not prevail, except as noted below, even though the United States
had greater influence in the negotiation of the original Articles than any
other country.
_
Two provisions of the original Articles did confer authority on an external entity to affect the exchange rate of a currency. The IMF could decide,
on its own initiative and by a majority of the total voting power (in contrast
to a majority of the votes cast), to make uniform proportionate changes in
the par values of all currencies, provided that such a change was approved
by every member that had ten percent of the total quotas. The proviso was
intended to be a discreet formula for vetoes that the United States and the
United Kingdom would be able to exercise. The objective of the provision
was to permit the IMF to expand or contract international liquidity by devaluing or revaluing all currencies, or, in other words, to increase or decrease the price of gold in currency, because gold was the common
denominator of the par value system.28
A uniform proportionate change in the par values of all currencies
would not have affected the parities between currencies. Nevertheless, to
respect the authority of members over their currencies, the Articles permitted a member that acted promptly to prevent the change from applying to
its own currency. If a member exercised this option, it would be revaluing
its currency against the currencies of members that were accepting the effect
of a uniform proportionate devaluation, or devaluing its currency against
the currencies of members that were accepting the effect of a uniform proportionate revaluation. In either of these circumstances, the decision of the
IMF would have brought about, in a certain sense, a change in the parities
between the currencies of the member that took itself out of the decision
and other currencies. The IMF never took a decision to make a uniform
proportionate change in the par values of all currencies.
The other provision on exchange rates imposed by an external entity
related to the separate currencies of a member's dependencies. A member
26. See 3 J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 3, at 42, 60 & 89.
27. "[T)he authority to set the rates of exchange at which the Fund is willing to operate can
be an important and in some cases a decisive influence on the rate at which transactions are
made outside of the Fund." 3 J. Horsefield, supra note 3, at 60.
28. Article IV, Section 7, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
openedforsignature July 22, 1944, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. In the
First Amendment, the provision was modified by substituting the majority of 85 percent of
total voting power and abrogating the proviso (the effect of which was to deprive the United
Kingdom of its former veto). The Second Amendment substitutes the majority of 70 percent
of the total voting power. See Schedule C, paragraph 11, Second Amendment to the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, entered into force Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T.
2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. The provision relates not to the control of liquidity, but to the necessity to adapt the SOR basket in certain circumstances if the par value system of Schedule C is
in force and the SDR is the common denominator.
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had to undertake that the Articles would be observed in respect of all its
dependent territories, whatever their status might be in constitutional or
international law. Dependent territories could not, and cannot now, become
members. They may have their own currencies, however, called "separate
currencies" by the Articles, and some of these currencies may be important
in international payments. Under the par value system, a member was responsible to the IMF for establishing, and had the privilege of changing, the
par values of separate currencies in accordance with the procedures of the
Articles. A member's consitutional or political arrangements might have
conceded actual authority to the government of a dependency over the exchange rate of its currency, but these arrangements did not affect the relationship between the member and the IMF or the member's responsibility
as described above. 29

Legal Effectiveness
The effectiveness of a system for the international regulation of exchange rates may be judged by reference to the purposes of the system,
which are likely to be economic. That judgment can be left to economists.
They will not agree among themselves. Effectiveness can be judged according to another criterion. It is more objective and within the province of
international law. To what extent have the legal prescriptions of a system
been observed? This inquiry can go beyond compliance and encompass the
question of the extent to which countries have undertaken to observe the
prescriptions. The distinction between economic and legal effectiveness is
not complete. Legal effectiveness connotes economic effectiveness because
it can be assumed that if a system does not satisfy economic aspirations,
governments may decide not to observe the legal prescriptions of the system
or to withdraw from it.
By August 15, 1971, 118 countries had become members of the IMF.
The major countries that had not become members were the U.S.S.R.,
which had attended the Bretton Woods Conference, and Switzerland,
which had not. Swiss representatives have frequently asserted that they are
more punctilious in conforming to the underlying principles of the Bretton
Woods system than some members, notwithstanding the absence of an undertaking. Over the course of time, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, and
Poland withdrew from the IMF, but Indonesia reentered with little delay.
Only the case of Czechoslovakia involved issues related to the provisions on
par values.
In the period 1945 to 1955, various members that had established par
values floated their currencies in violation of their obligations. Other members had not established par values, or were applying multiple currency
practices that made their par values wholly or largely meaningless, or were
applying restrictions on payments and transfers for current international
transactions as measures in support of their par values. An established par
29. See Article IV, Section 9, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
openedfar signature July 22, 1944, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. For the
somewhat similar provision of the present Articles, see Article V, Section 5, Second Agreement
to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, entered into farce Apr. 1,
1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
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value, therefore, did not mean that a member had achieved an exchange
system that was the ideal of the Articles.
On March 15, 1971, when the IMF issued its last Schedule of Par Values, 26 of the 117 members at that time had not yet established par values
and 8 that had done so were failing in their obligations to make their par
values effective. The 26 members were not in violation because the IMF
had not called on them to establish initial par values. The IMF recognized
that the economic circumstances of these members would have prevented
them from maintaining effective par values. The IMF's restraint demonstrated that par values were not the optimal exchange arrangement for all
members at all times. The IMF encouraged some members that had established par values but were in difficulties to float their currencies as a transition to new and effective par values. All but one of the 34 members were
developing countries. It must not be thought that the exchange systems of
all the other 83 members were free from multiple currency practices or restrictions on payments and transfers.
Too gloomy a deduction must not be drawn from these statistics. With
the exception of Canada for lengthy periods, and the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Netherlands for brief periods, developed members maintained effective par values. It follows that the world's trade and payments
were conducted in large part on the basis of effective par values. On August
15, 1971, the floating of the dollar in violation of the obligations of the
United States under the Articles brought the par value system of the Articles to a violent end.
After the breakdown, many members availed themselves of the IMF's
decisions on central rates and wider margins for a time. The United States
never declared a central rate and devalued the dollar twice, but took no
action to make the par value effective. It was left to other members that
wished to maintain a fixed relationship to the dollar, either on the basis of a
par value or a central rate, to take the measures necessary for this purpose.
The United Kingdom decided to allow sterling to float independently in
June 1972, and Japan took the same step for the yen in February 1973. The
Canadian dollar floated at all times; the floating of the Italian lira began on
February 13, 1973. A number of members of the EC maintained narrow
margins based on central rates for transactions involving their own currencies, and wider margins in relation to the dollar ("the snake in the tunnel"),
but in March 1973 abandoned these latter margins. The French franc was
allowed to float in January 1974.
The experience of the past was being reversed: the currencies of major
industrialized countries were floating while many developing countries
sought to peg their currencies in some way. The floating of major currencies was one of the main reasons why the Guidelines on the Management of
Floating Exchange Rates were adopted. The decision was never more than
a gesture. No member declared a target zone. The members that had floating currencies resented the stricter surveillance that was to be exercised over
them as compared with members that pegged their currencies. This lesson
in resistance to asymmetry explains why the Second Amendment refers to
the IMF's duty to adopt specific principles for the guidance of "all members" with respect to their exchange rate policies.
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Nothing has been published that suggests a finding by the IMF of a
violation of the present provisions of the Articles on exchange arrangements or of the nonobservance by a member of the IMF's specific principles. As noted already, the corollary of the imprecision of the present law is
that the inconsistency of a member's behavior with the Articles or with the
specific principles cannot be determined without a decision of the IMF. The
absence of a decision need not imply consistency because of the IMF's
traditional preference for quiet persuasion and its reluctance to adopt censorious decisions.
The discipline that an international organization can exert is stronger if
the organization's authority is exercised before a member initiates policies.
If the organization can act only after policies are in place, discipline is
weaker because members are more willing to run the risk of formal disapprobation. They know that this reaction is unlikely and that a finding of
violation is even more unlikely.
U.S. negotiators hoped that the IMF's jurisdiction over exchange rate
policies would become firmer notwithstanding the imprecision of the relevant provisions of the Second Amendment. As the IMF accumulated experience in performing its function of firm surveillance, an expanding code of
specific principles would be formulated. U.S. negotiators cited the example
of case-law in common law systems. This analogy has proved to be inapposite: the three specific principles announced originally by the IMF, in language as imprecise as the Articles, have not been sharpened or augmented.
Experience has resulted in a progressive elaboration of the procedures for
surveillance but not of the specific principles.30
No participant in the exchange arrangements of the EMS has withdrawn from them, although from time to time the newspapers have reported that a member was considering withdrawal. In this respect, the EMS
has been more effective than "the snake," in which participation shrank
from time to time. Although no participant has withdrawn from the exchange arrangements of the EMS, their effectiveness has been diminished
by the decision of the United Kingdom not to participate in them.
All changes in central rates have been made in accordance with the legal
provisions governing the EMS, although there has been some criticism that
the number and increasing frequency of changes are evidence that a zone of
stability has not been achieved. The reply is made that the EMS should be
considered a system of neither fixed nor floating exchange rates but a system of jointly managed rates.
Some General Reflections

I. The models for the international regulation of exchange rates that
have been or are in force demonstrate that, for the last four decades, governments have accepted the principle that exchange rates are properly matters of international concern. Governments have given practical expression
to this concern by subjecting exchange rates to international agreement or
at least to international scrutiny. The right to initiate changes in exchange
30. For a more detailed account of the present position, see Gold, Strengthening the Soft
International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INTL. L. 443 (1983).
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rates has been among the retained powers. The IMF's former authority to
decide on a uniform proportionate change in the par values of the currencies of all members had no practical importance.
2. The unwillingness of governments to concede the power of initiative
to international organizations is matched by the unwillingness of governments to accept dictation by formula. In the discussions of reform in the
Committee of 20, U.S. representatives proposed "objective indicators" in
the shape of staggered changes in the level of a member's monetary
reserves. These developments would have created an obligation or at least a
strong presumption that a member should take steps, including possibly a
change in exchange rate, to adjust the balance of payments. The U.S. representatives argued that governments and the public would prefer the
mechanism of objective indicators, and graduated pressures based on them,
rather than the exercise of discretion by an international organization. The
assumption about the preference of other governments proved to be wrong:
the U.S. ideas received little support and much opposition. The exercise of
discretion by the IMF was preferred because a government would have the
opportunity to persuade the IMF that the government's action or inaction
was justifiable.31
The divergence indicator of the EMS is an objective indicator, but one
that relies on a formula based on the behavior of exchange rates and not
changes in monetary reserves. The indicator is a remarkable development,
even if it creates no more than a presumption of the need to take action,
and even if the indicator was invented as a compromise between opposing
groups in the negotiation of a crucial feature of the exchange arrangements
of the EMS.
3. A study confined to the legal provisions of any system for the regulation of exchange rates will not provide a true impression of the system.
The life of a system depends on the administration of it once the negotiators
have finished their task. To understand the par value system, for example,
it must be realized that the administration of the legal provisions was affected by two tendencies, which may seem to have been contradictory but
which were not difficult to reconcile. The international staff tended to conclude that all aspects of exchange were subject to the scrutiny of the IMF.
The Executive Board was not disposed to limit the jurisdiction of the IMF
in matters relating to exchange rates, but, in applying the law, tended to
give the benefit of any doubt to a member. It is possible that these two
tendencies will be present in any system administered by an organization
that includes within its structure a permanent staff and an executive organ
composed of persons appointed or elected by member governments.
4. The coexistence of a variety of international arrangements for the
regulation of exchange rates can pose a problem of reconciliation when a
country belongs to more than one of these arrangements. The EC was
aware of this problem when it declared that the EMS is and will remain
fully compatible with the relevant provisions of the IMF's Articles. The
"snake" was a cooperative arrangement among some members of the EC
that was in existence when the Second Amendment was negotiated. Some
31. See Developments in the International Monetary System, supra note 5, at 193-201.
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of the countries that belonged to both the EC and the IMF negotiated express mention of cooperative arrangements among the arrangements that
members can maintain consistently with their freedom of choice, even
though this mention is redundant. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine
that problems of reconciliation might arise in the operation of the EMS and
the IMF.
An example can be cited of a problem of reconciling the EMS, not with
a multilateral organization such as the IMF, but with so intimate a bilateral
arrangement as the Economic Union of Belgium and Luxembourg (BLEU).
When the central rate of the Belgian franc in the EMS was reduced on
February 22, 1982, the Luxembourg authorities, whose franc is legally the
equivalent of the Belgian franc, are said to have complained that they were
not consulted in advance. This situation hastened parliamentary approval
in Luxembourg of the statute of May 20, 1983, authorizing the creation of a
central monetary institution for that country with power to break the equivalence between the two currencies.
Membership in the IMF has been open to countries that belong to a
monetary union. The IMF recognizes only the individual membership of
states. It has been necessary, therefore, for the IMF to conclude that each
member of a monetary union will be able to perform its obligations under
the Articles notwithstanding the close association that members of the
union must maintain in matters relating to their common currency.
5. A lesson of monetary history is that exchange arrangements are not
permanent. There may be an alternation between fixed and floating systems. When the present system of free choice was introduced, the way in
which it would behave was not foreseen. The economics of floating is being
learned slowly. The dissatisfaction with which many monetary authorities
view present multilateral arrangements has not yet led to a widely acceptable alternative.
To arrive at such an alternative would be an immense task. Power is
distributed in the present world. The United States cannot exercise the
overwhelming influence that it enjoyed in the years when its leadership produced the original Articles of the IMF. If its positive power is now less, its
negative power is still enormous. That is to say, if the United States does
not lead, it cannot be made to move, and its movement is necessary for
change.
If the international community were to arrive at agreement on an alternative to the present system, the Articles as now written would provide ample accommodation for change however sharp it might be. It is probably
important to realize that the Articles would permit measured evolution.
The IMF could adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members
with respect to their exchange arrangements, and the IMF could give content to the obligation of members to collaborate with the IMF and other
members to bring about orderly arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. All these possibilities exist even if it never becomes
feasible to call into operation the flexible par value system included in the
Articles.

